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fosters collusion, as long as Vickers (pp.142-4) stresses the strategic advantage
brought about by managerialization, which amounts to appointing the leader’s role to the firm
that proceeds to the separation between ownership and control, provided the rivals do not imitate
her. Since this is precisely what they would do in order to avoid playing the follower’s role, the
result would be overproduction and lower profits respect to the case of competition between
entrepreneurial firms. Our results re-establish a case in favour of managerialization, to the extent
that such an organizational choice enhances firms’ ability to collude: owners can strategically
use the tendency of managers to excessively expand production, in order to foster implicit
collusion and gain higher profits.
5. Conclusions
Extending to the repeated game setting a framework originally introduced by Vickers
(1985), we have tackled the issue of whether delegation can foster cartel stability in a duopoly
where firms offer a homogeneous product under Cournot competition. The answer is twofold.
If only one firm is managerial, then she has a stronger incentive to deviate from the collusive
agreement as compared to what happens when both are entrepreneurial. The opposite holds for
the rival that has not proceeded to the separation between ownership and control. Overall, cartel
stability is reduced by the managerialization of only one firm. On the contrary, when both firms
are run by managers interested in the level of sales, this enhances the stability of collusive
agreements, since both firms expand production even if they play noncooperatively.
The emergence of implicit collusion in games of strategic delegation is not new: it has
been shown by Fershtman, Judd and Kalai (1991) and Polo and Tedeschi (1992) specifying the
compensation schemes for managers with and without relative performance evaluation,
respectively. Here we have shown that analogous results hold in a repeated game model with
no reference at all to the features of the contract between owners and managers. The inclusion
of sales in the objective function in sufficient per se to create incentives towards cooperation
through the overproduction due to managers’ behaviour and to stabilize such collusion, provided
that all firms are managerial.
θ ∈]0, (a − c)/4].
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the corresponding equilibrium profits are:
It is known (Vickers, 1985, p.142) that the optimal value of θ in the strictly noncooperative
game is which entails a larger production and lower profits as compared to the
setting where both firms are strictly profit-maximizers. Both elements suggest that firms have
a stronger incentive towards collusion than in the case in which at least one is entrepreneurial.
Cartel profits are defined by (8). It is quickly shown that deviation quantities and profit are the
same as in (18-19), so that the critical discount factor, for both firms, is
The critical discount factor is everywhere decreasing in θ, with a discountinuity at
The behaviour of is illustrated in figure 2.
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
For all implying that the cartel would be less stable. Though, since firms
wuold never choose in this interval, we can conclude that managerialization of both firms
qi
N
= qj
N
=
a − c + θ
3b ; (27
pii
N
= pij
N
=
(a − c − 2t) (a − c + t)
9b . (28
θ* = (a − c)/5,
˜αi =
9(a − c − 4θ)
17a − 17c − 4θ, i = 1, 2. (29
θ = 17(a − c)/4. ˜αi
θ > 17(a − c)/4, ˜αi > 9,
θ
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It is quickly verified that
In the intervals specified above for θ, the incentive to cheat for firm 2 is reduced by the
managerialization operated by firm 1. Nevertheless, except for
and the optimal value of θ is the
cartel is indeed less stable as far as only one firm 2 is managerial.
4. Collusion between managerial firms
Assume now both firms have operated a separation between ownership and control, and
both managers assign a positive weight θ to sales. Given the symmetry of the problem, this
weight needs no indexation (verifica). The generic objective function looks now as follows:
the outcome of the present framework can be summarized in
PROPOSITION 2: when both firms are managerial, cartel stability is enhanced in the relevant
range of parameters.
PROOF. Differentiating (25) w.r.t. qi yields the FOC:
from (26) we can derive the optimal quantities:
˜α2 <
9
17
∀θ ∈]0, 2(a − c) [. (24
θ ∈] (7 + √97) (a − c)/8, 17(a − c)/8[, ˜α1 > ˜α2, θ* = (a − c)/4,
Mi = pii + θqi; (25
∂M1
∂qi
= a − c − 2bqi − bqJ + θ = 0; (26
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it is easy to verify that so that the managerialization of firm 1 lowers cartel
stability from the point of view of the same firm, i.e., it does not decrease her incentive to cheat.
If the two discount factors coincide, so that if θ is properly chosen after deviation the
observed behaviour of the deviating firm is the same independently of her structure.
Let us turn to firm 2. Assuming firm 1 is loyal, the deviation output for firm 2 can be
derived from condition (16):
and the profit accruing to the entrepreneurial firm from deviation is
The critical discount factor in this case is the following:
The behaviour of and is represented in figure 1. The behaviour of beyond
is reported only for completeness.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
˜α1 > 9/17 ∀θ > 0,
θ = 0,
q2
D
=
3(a − c)
8b , (21
pi2
D
=
9(a − c)2
64b . (22
˜α2 =
9(a − c)2
(17a − 17c − 8θ) (a − c + 8θ) > 0 ∀θ <
17
8 (a − c). (23
˜α1 ˜α2 ˜α2 θ = 17(a − c)/8
7
(13-14) yields:
As pointed out by Vickers (1985, p.142), the value of θ maximizing is The
managerial firm earns a profit which is twice as much as that accruing to the rival, and is virtually
appointed the Stackelberg leader’s role.
If firms collude in quantities, they obviously obtain the same profits as defined in (8).
What distinguishes this setting from the previous is that deviation gives different profits and
consequently different critical discount factors for the two firms. Consider first the deviation
by the managerial firm, assuming firm 2 sticks to the collusive output. The deviation quantity
for firm 1 is obtained from condition (15):
yielding
as the deviation profit. Notice that, since is decreasing in θ, its optimal value in case ov
deviation from the agreement is nil. We can now proceed to compute the critical discount factor
relative to the managerial firm,
pi1
N
=
(a − c − θ) (a − c + 2θ)
9b , pi2
N
=
(a − c − θ)2
9b . (17
pi1
N θ* = (a − c)/4.
pii
C
q1
D
=
3(a − c) + 4θ
8b , (18
pi1
D
=
(3a − 3c + 4θ) (3a − 3c − 4θ)
64b (19
pi1
D
˜α1 =
9(a − c + 4θ)
17a − 17c + 4θ ; (20
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so that the punishment strategy is credible. The critical value of the discount factor sustaining
collusion is then
so that, if both firms have a discount factor greater than 9/17 neither finds it profitable deviating
from the cartel.
3. Collusion with a managerial firm
Assume now firm 1 proceeds to separate ownership and control, and her manager attaches
a positive weight θ to sales. Thus, the objective functions look as follows:
In such a case, we can state the following
PROPOSITION 1: if only one firm is managerial, cartel stability is weakened as compared to
the case in wich both firms are profit-maximizers.
PROOF. The FOCs obtained by differentiating (13) and (14) w.r.t. q1 and q2, respectively, are:
solving the system (15-16) w.r.t. to quantities and substituting the latter into objective functions
˜αi = ˜αj =
piD − piC
piD − piN
=
9
17
, (12
M1 = pi1 + θq1; (13
pi2 = (p − c)q2. (14
∂M1
∂q1
= a − c − 2bq1 − bq2 + θ = 0, (15
∂pi2
∂q2
= a − c − 2bq2 − bq1 = 0; (16
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Differentiating (6) w.r.t. q1 and q2 and solving, yields
and equilibrium profits are
Let us now turn to deviation profits. Given the symmetry of the model, we assume that firm i
sticks to the collusive output, while firm j deviates. From (3), we compute the deviation output
for firm j:
yielding as deviation profits
while the profit of the loyal firm is
ΠC = (p − c) (q1 + q2). (6
q1
C
= q2
C
=
(a − c)
4b , (7
ΠC = (a − c)
2
4b ; pi1
C
= pi2
C
=
(a − c)2
8b . (8
qj
D
=
3(a − c)
8b , (9
pij
D
=
9(a − c)2
64b , (10
pii(qjD) =
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32b < pii
N
, (11
4
where ri is firm i’s discount rate, and is the critical level of the discount factor above which
cartel stability is ensured.
Consider first the noncooperative setting. Two firms compete in quantities in a market for
a homogeneous good. The inverse demand function is given by Firms produce
at constant marginal cost, i=1,2, with a>c. The generic profit function is then
differentiating (2) respect to qi, we obtain the first order condition (FOC) for firm i:
solving the FOCs w.r.t. quantities, we get
Substituting equilibrium quantities (4) into the above profit functions we obtain equilibrium
profits,
Assume now that firms collude, setting quantities so as to maximize joint profits:
αi =
1
1 + ri
≥ ˜αi =
pii
D
− pii
C
pii
D
− pii
N > 0, ∀i , (1
˜αi
p = a − b (q1 + q2).
Ci = cqi,
pii = (a − bqi − bqj − c)qi; i , j = 1, 2, i ≠ j; (2
∂pii
∂qi
= a − 2bqi − bqj − c = 0; (3
q1
N
= q2
N
=
(a − c)
3b . (4
pi1
N
= pi2
N
=
(a − c)2
9b . (5
3
contracts are public information. This implies that the collusive outcome can be attained in
noncooperative single-period games, without resorting to repeated ones.
Relying on a setting introduced by Vickers (1985), we analyse cartel stability under
Cournot competition in a duopoly where at least one firm delegates control over her assets to a
manager who is interested in the volume of sales. We show that, if only one firm is managerial,
she has a stronger incentive to deviate from the collusive agreement as compared to the case in
which both firms maximize only profits; on the contrary, the rival firm has a weaker incentive
towards deviation, if the weight attached to sales is properly set by the managerial firm. If both
firms operate a separation between ownership and control, then there exists an interval in which
any positive weight attached to sales enhance cartel stability, and this interval contains the
optimal value of the weight, i.e., the value that maximizes each firm’s profit. Thus, in the latter
setting, the sustainability of collusion is enhanced, providing simply that the contract between
each principal and her manager sets the weight of sales into the objective function at the level
that agents would autonomously choose in the strictly noncooperative game.
Collusive behaviour in the absence of delegation is analysed in section 2. Section 3 is
devoted to the asymmetric case in which only one firm is managerial. The symmetric setting in
which both firms are managerial is described in section 4. Section 5 contains final comments.
2. Collusion between profit-seeking firms
By now, the conditions underlying collusion in an infinitely repeated game are familiar,
so we can sketch them very briefly. As first shown by Friedman (1971), in a repeated setting
firms can sustain collusion, which wuold not be possible should they interact once and for all.
The implicit collusion thus arising can be thought of as a contract that is not legally enforceable,
so that to be sustainable it must be defined as a subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated
game. Collusion can be an equilibrium if the discount factor is high enough and the one-shot
Nash equilibrium is adopted as a punishment mechanism. Thus, let and be firm i’s
profits from the noncooperative one-shot game, collusion and deviation, respectively, with
Then collusion is sustainable if
pii
N
, pii
C pii
D
pii
D > pii
C > pii
N
.
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1. Introduction
The issue of cartel stability has received wide attention in the literature. The question how
variations in cartel size affects the fortunes of those inside and outside the cartelhas been explored
by D’Aspremont et al. (1983), Donsimoni (1985) and Donsimoni et al. (1986), reaching the
conclusion that stable cartels exist whenever the number of firms is finite. The relative efficiency
of Bertrand and Cournot competition in stabilizing cartels composed of firms whose products
are imperfect substitutes has been analysed by Deneckere (1983), showing that when substi-
tutability between products is high, collusion is better supported in price-setting games than in
quantity-setting games, while the reverse is true in case of low substitutability. Majerus (1988)
has proved that this result is not confirmed as the number of firms increases, and Rothschild
(1992), in contrast with Deneckere’s findings, has shown that in a price-setting duopoly, the
greater the degree of substitutability, the greater is the incentive to deviate and therefore the less
stable the cartel is, while in quantity-setting games cartel stability is monotonically increasing
in the degree of substitutability between products. Finally, the issue of the influence of product
differentiation on the stability of collusion has been tackled by Chang (1991), Ross (1992) and
Häckner (1994). The main finding reached by these contributions is that, under vertical diffe-
rentiation,collusion is moreeasily sustained, themore similar theproducts are, while theopposite
applies under horizontal differentiation.
The early literature on strategic delegation (Fershtman, 1985; Vickers, 1985; Fershtman
and Judd, 1987; Sklivas, 1987), in which the agents’ game strategies are not conditional upon
compensation schemes, leads to the conclusion that delegation may yield more competitive
equilibria. A few recent contributions suggest though that separation between ownership and
management may more easily give rise to collusive behaviour by firms, i.e., owners can induce
a more collusive behaviour in the market game between managers (see Fershtman, Judd and
Kalai, 1991; Polo and Tedeschi, 1992), provided that each principal is fully committed to the
contract signed with her agent and all contracts are fully observed, and thus can be conditioned
upon in the agents’ game. This extra commitment is strictly needed to implement the collusive
outcome by delegation. It is not necessary to resort to settings where contracts between the main
players can be enforced, what is only needed is the possibility of hiring agents providing that
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